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ABSTRACT
, Healthcare fraud is a major problem within the

healthcare industry.

The study examined this problem.

The

study examined medical fraud, its laws, and punishments on
federal and state levels.

It compared medical fraud to

non-fraud crimes done in the healthcare industry. This

comparison will be done on a state level.

The study

attempted to analyze the severity of fraud against non

fraud and that doctors would commit fraud offenses more

often than non-fraud offenses.
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CHAPTER ONE
INTRODUCTION

Background

During the 1930s President Herbert Hoover created the

Committee on the Costs of Medical Care (CMCC).

This was

the forefather to the Medicaid Program created in 1965.
Ever since programs like Medicaid and Medicare have been

around healthcare physicians have tried to defraud them.
Numerous laws such as the Medicaid False Claims Statute and

the Stark Amendments have been passed to fight fraud but
the problem doesn't have an end in sight.

Individual

states have also passed their own laws to keep healthcare
professionals from taking advantage of the system.

At the

same time though, officials at the state and federal levels

also combat non-fraud healthcare crimes such as negligence
and incompetence.

Statement of Problem
Skeen (2003) states that health care is the number-one
industry in the country.

It is estimated that by 2011

health care spending will reach 2.8 trillion dollars thus

making up 17% of the Gross Domestic Product (Schreiber,
1

Prasow, & Martin, 2002).

With the healthcare industry

increasing in monetary profit the industry is being

attacked by individuals.

The problem that the proposed

study will look at is healthcare fraud. Schreiber, Prasow,
and Martin (2002) state that fraud takes in 10% of total

expenditures for health care and costs taxpayers up to $100

billion a year.

The problem is not only one of national

concern but of state concern as well.
States have their laws and codes to attack fraud as
well.

Even though laws have been created and passed to

fight fraud on federal and state levels the problem seems

to have no end.

In order for the nation to take a hit

financially the problem has to start with the state.

It

has to be asked if the states are doing enough to stop

fraud before it reaches a point to where the nation is

going to suffer for it.

Purpose of the Study

The study is significant because it attempts to draw
comparisons between healthcare fraud and non-fraud related
crimes in the healthcare industry.

By doing this, the

study will attempts to examine how closely related

punishments for fraud and non-fraud crimes are.
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The study

will then examine that relationship in order to see if

enough is being done on a state level to decrease the fraud
problem.

By examining the punishments the study examined

if punishments need to be harsher for fraud related crimes
on the state level.

Limitations of the Study
Limitations to the study were that a database had to
be created from existing statistics.

These statistics were

only as good as the data used to create them.

Other

limitations that the study faced is in the sample.

Only a

certain group of physicians were used for the study.

The

existing data will come from California only thus only

giving a California perspective of the problem.

This means

that federal laws and punishments will not be the main

source for answering the research questions.

3

CHAPTER TWO
LITERATURE REVIEW

Introduction

Everyday many people depend on healthcare
professionals.

Many aspects of our lives and health are

affected by healthcare professionals.

Many people, when

entrusting aspects of their life to others, are not

thinking of the criminal aspects that could be hiding.
Crime is commonly thought of as a poor inner-city
phenomenon in which any crimes committed by the middle-and

upper- classes either go undetected or unreported.

Yet,

crime does occur in upper and middle classes with medical
professionals taking a part in crime.

Within the medical field there are laws and codes that
must be upheld.

Sometimes these are broken and punishments

must be administered.

These laws and codes address such

crimes as medical fraud, negligence, giving wrong
prescriptions, sexually harassing patients, and giving the

wrong diagnosis.

Punishments for these crimes can be wide

and various, and sometimes, overlapping.

The largest of

the medical professional crimes is healthcare fraud.

Medical fraud should not be thought of as other healthcare
4

crimes.

It needs to be viewed and punished differently in

order for the abuse to lessen.

Medicaid-A History

During the 1930s President Herbert Hoover created the
Committee on the Costs of Medical Care (CMCC).

This

committee assessed the health care situation in the United

States and part of this multivolume assessment dealt

primarily with low-income people and their efforts in
The 1950s saw the rise of

trying to procure healthcare.

the Kerr-Mills program which, expanded health care to the

elderly but failed due to poor funding and structure.

It

did not include the blind, disabled, or poor people with
dependent children.

Along with the Kerr-Mills programs

came the Medical Assistance to the Aged program (MZXA) .

The

main point of this program focused on states deciding the
control of costs, specification of program upper limits,

and a definition of poverty.
failed.

Like the Kerr-Mills, it too

Congress finally decided to overhaul the programs

with a replacement program (Goldfield, 2003).
Started in 1965, Medicaid was enacted through Title IX

of the Social Security Act.

It is designed to provide

medical assistance to those whose income and resources are
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insufficient to meet the costs of care and services (Atkins
v. Rivera, 1986).

To qualify for Medicaid one must show

that he or she is an American citizen or permanent resident

alien, live in a state where Medicaid benefits are
available, are aged, blind, or disabled, or the parent of a
minor as well as being financially needy according to
Medicaid standards (Bigler, Archer, & Regan, 1993).

Like

other programs set up by the government Medicaid has gone
through several amendments.

Some major changes include the

Medicare Catastrophic Coverage Act of 1988, the Omnibus
Reconciliation Act of 1993, and the Supplemental Security
Income for Aged, Blind, and Disabled (Ahmad, 1999) .
Medicaid is only one part of the United States' health

care system but it is a primary target of those who wish to

defraud it.

The crimes of health care fraud extend beyond

Medicaid though.

In order to decrease Medicaid fraud it is

important to know about the different types of health care

fraud that are committed everyday in the United States.

Healthcare Fraud
Skeen (2003) states that health care is the number-one

industry in the country.

It is estimated that by 2011

health care spending will reach 2.8 trillion dollars thus
6

making up 17% of the Gross Domestic Product (Schreiber,

Prasow, & Martin, 2002).

With so much money pouring into

health care it is almost the perfect industry to defraud.

According to Schreiber, Prasow, and Martin (2002) fraud
takes in 10% of total expenditures for health care and
costs taxpayers up to $100 billion a year.

The government

has targeted Medicaid and Medicare as the main targets of

defrauders within the health care industry.

In discussing

health care fraud the first question asked is why does it

occur?
The health care system has six characteristics that
open it up to fraud.

involved.

First, large amounts of money are

Second, there are announcements of the money's

availability.

This means that defrauders attack the fee-

for-service method of payment.
security in the industry.

Third, there is a lack of

Davis (1995) states that the

more investigators there are the larger the case load thus

making unknown the number of fraud cases that fall through
the cracks.

Fourth, low levels of surveillance create low

chances for apprehension and punishment.

not equally tempted to commit crimes.

Fifth, people are

Some crimes involve

a certain amount of danger while others, like Medicaid
fraud is easier and therefore will take advantage of the
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system.

Lastly, "good financial investment is an effective

way of protecting the money" (Skeen, 2003, p. 518).

In

other words, whatever an agency spends it saves a higher
amount.

This hurts due to the fact that agencies are

understaffed as stated earlier (Skeen, 2003).

Skeen (2003) further states that due to these six
characteristics illegal activity can be expected because

the gain is so high in this industry.

First, there is a

large amount of illegitimate money to be made per offense.
Secondly, there are no direct costs incurred by the
offenders because the money is made off the costs.

the costs can be inflated (Skeen, 2003).

Third,

Davis (1995)

states that 90 percent of all hospital bills are wrong,

while Jesilow, Geis, and Harris (1995) states that the
errors favor the providers.

Billing can be altered up for

a more expensive service than the one that was done and

services that were not done can be billed for as well
(Taylor, 1992).

Fourth, the risk of apprehension is low.

Fifth, the

penalty if convicted usually requires little or no jail
time, but rather the convicted person has to put the money

back.

Lastly, a person's taste for crime; most crimes are

risky, health care fraud is not (Skeen, 2003).
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Ehrlich

(1996) states that it is very simple to commit an act of
health care fraud and abuse.
These issues emphasize that there is a problem with

the Medicaid program.

With Medicaid designed to help the

underprivileged it should not be an easy mark.

The

elderly, blind, and disabled have more than enough to worry

about than whether or not their program is being taken for
millions.

Of course, anything pertaining to the less

fortunate is always an easy target only because of

clientele.

The General Accounting Office states that

Medicaid is fragmented, poorly supervised, and awash in
public money (Korcok, 1997).

It is the perfect system to defraud.

Costs are paid

by the government which means that the receivers of the
benefits do not have to worry about how much they have to

spend and the money is easily accessible by practitioners
and drug companies (Korcok, 1997).

Deterrence Theory

Healthcare fraud is committed because of the large

amount of money to be made.

Even though this is, there is

another way to explain why healthcare fraud is committed.

Deterrence theory is a theory that can be applied as to why
9

medical professionals commit healthcare fraud.
theory, at its core, has three principles.

Deterrence

These

principles are certainty, severity, and celerity of
punishments (Akers & Sellers, 2004).
Deterrence theory states "...that actions are taken and

decisions are made by persons in the rational exercise of

free will.

All individuals choose to obey or violate the

law by a rational calculation of the risk of the pain
versus potential pleasure derived from an act.

In

contemplating a criminal act, they take into account the

probable legal penalties and the likelihood that they will
be caught.

If they believe that the legal penalty

threatens more pain than the probable gain produced by the

crime then they will not commit the crime.

Their

calculation is based on their own experience with the

criminal punishment, their knowledge of what punishment is

imposed by law, and their awareness of what punishment has
been given to apprehended offenders in the past" (Akers &

Sellers, p. 18).

The above definition pertains to the severity aspect
of deterrence theory.

The certainty and celerity

principles of the theory states that "...in order to deter,

the punishment for crime must be swift and certain.
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Celerity refers to the swiftness with which criminal

sanctions are applied after the commission of crime" (Akers
& Sellers, p. 19) .

According to the theory deterrence operates through
specific and general deterrence.

Specific deterrence

states that "...apprehended and punished offenders will
refrain from committing crimes if they are certainly caught
and severely punished...general deterrence...punishment of
offenders serves as an example to those in the general

public who have not yet committed a crime, instilling in

them enough fear of state punishment to deter them from
crime" (Zimring, 1971; Zimring & Hawkins, 1973).

Deterrence theory fits in with those who commit
healthcare fraud.

Healthcare professionals will outweigh

the punishment of getting caught with that of the potential

gain.

If the punishment is not too severe then that is

when the crime occurs.

Since healthcare fraud has a low

risk of apprehension and a high chance of reward healthcare

professionals will commit the crime after rationalizing the

punishment to the reward.
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Types of Fraud—Terms of the Crime
Lovitky (1997, p. 42-44) lists several types of fraud

concerning fee-for-service payment methods:

•

Overutilization- "Providing unnecessary services...Fraud

may occur when more services are provided than are
medically necessary or when services not provided are
billed".

•

Upcoding- "Assigning a Current Procedure Terminology
(CPT) code that reflects a higher level of service

than actually was provided".
•

Billing for services not provided- "Perhaps the

simplest form of health care fraud. .

. the only issue

to be resolved is whether the bill was submitted
intentionally or through oversight".
Fraud types in managed care systems differ greatly

according to Lovitky (p.44) as well.
•

Failing to provide necessary services- "Managed care.
. . rendered by professionals.
capitulation basis".

.

. paid on a

Fraud happens when the

professional does not provide the services to the

person thus endangering his or her health and is often
"viewed as a theft of taxpayer dollars".
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The longer

the person is treated the more taxpayer money is put
in.
•

Filing false cost reports- "Cost reports...filled by

providers who are paid under Medicare Part A...These
costs must be filled in accordance with the Health
Care Financing Administration regulations that are
designed to ensure that only allowable costs are

charged to the government.

. . Distinguishing an

unallowable cost as an allowable cost" is the essence

of false cost reports fraud.

Payne (1995) states there are two types of offenses
generally found against Medicaid which have to do with

intent.

These two definitions separate the line between

fraud and abuse.

"Medicaid fraud includes those fraudulent

acts where intent is present" (Geis, Jesilow, Pontell, &
O'Brien, 1985, p. 831).

Towery and Sharfstein (1978) state

Medicaid abuse involves those offenses where intent is not

present.

Prescription Fraud

Payne (1997) examined 292 cases of prescription fraud
as prosecuted by Medicaid Fraud Control Units.
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The most

common offenses in prescription fraud were generic

substitution, short-counting, and filling prescriptions
without a refill.

The majority of the offenders were the

pharmacists themselves.

What kind of harm does

prescription fraud cause the health care system, the
individual, and society?
Pharmacists fill 1.6 billion prescriptions a year in

the United States (Wivell & Wilson, 1994).

With so many

prescriptions being filled one would assume that defrauding

the system would be easy and overlooked.

Once again, with

prescription fraud the system being attacked is Medicaid.
The fraud occurs because people do not believe that their

pharmacist is going to do anything that would hurt them.

After all, it is the pharmacist who is responsible for

creating the medications that keep so many alive and well
so why would fraud take place?

Ford (1992) states that

Americans have generally seen the pharmacist and his or her

industry as a trustworthy one.

From 1984 to 1994 the

pharmacy was rated as the most honest and ethical

occupation (McAnney & Moor, 1994).

Because of this trust

it is easy for the pharmacist to commit fraud.

The previous terms apply in prescription fraud as well
but with a slightly different context.
14

When a pharmacist

upcodes.he or she is filling the prescription with the

cheaper generic drug but billing for the brand name drug.

Phantom billing is when the pharmacist bills for a drug
that was never prescribed to the recipient while double

billing deals with the billing of more than one insurance
company for only one set of instructions.

Kickbacks are

when the pharmacist receives or gives funds in exchange for

referrals (Payne, 1997).

Prescription fraud attacks the Medicaid system by
depleting money out of it.

Pontell et al (1982) states

that prescription fraud takes away from the efficiency of

the system, thus resulting in cutbacks in the program

because of the lack of funds.

Once the defrauders have

taken the money it is hard to replenish the money.

The

individual is harmed because when the pharmacist gives a
cheaper version of the medication instead of what is

prescribed the effects can alter the health of the
individual (Payne, 1997).

Strategies to Combat Healthcare Fraud
Just as predicted by the Payne study the health care
industry is now beginning to feel the effects of fraud and

realize its implications.

Companies as well as the

15

government have recently started a concentrated effort

against fraud through different strategies.

Schreiber et

al (2002) states that the government has decided to
strengthen established statutes as well as creating new
laws to help fight the growing fraud problem.

This is the

government response in statutes and laws according to
Schreiber et al (2002).

Medicaid False Claims Statute
This statute states that there are criminal penalties

for the making of false statements or representations in

respect to payment or benefit claims or disposal of assets.
This statute is for federal health care programs and
carries a fine of $25,000 or less, five years or less of

prison time, or both (see Appendix A).

Medicaid Anti-Kickback Statute

This is an extensive statute covering any form of
remuneration.

Punishments for breaking this statute are a

fine of $25,000 or less, prison for up to five years, or

both (see Appendix B).
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Stark Amendments
These amendments are also known as the Omnibus

Reconciliation Act of 1989 and 1993.

These acts prohibit

physicians from sending patients to clinics or laboratories

where the physician has a financial interest.
expands upon the 1989 act.

The 1993 act

Penalties in violation of the

act are first, claims filed for service in violation of the

law results in a non-payment.

Second, money must be

refunded in a proper amount of time if money was taken in
violation of the law.

Third, a fine of up to $15,000 will

be imposed as well as exclusion from Medicaid and Medicare

programs (Schreiber, Prasow, and Martin, 2002) .

Health Insurance Portability and
Accountability Act of 1996
(HIPAA)

Perhaps the most important government law passed is
the Heath Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of
1996.

This act is the first stable source of funding to

attack fraud.

It has expanded the definition of kickback

so that all health care programs are included.

This act

also regulates private health care and has given the

government more prosecution power in both state and federal
realms.

It has also allowed "law enforcement personnel to
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employ administrative subpoenas, civil forfeiture, and

injunctive relief, and it ratcheted up the sanctions for

violating program requirements" (Hyman, 2002).

HIPPA has also "increased civil monetary penalties,
added new offenses that trigger permissive or mandatory .

exclusion from Medicare, specified minimum periods of
exclusion, broadened the group of individuals who could be
sanctioned in all of these ways, and imposed stiffed

penalties for violating the new-health-care specific
criminal statutes" (Hyman, 2002).

This act has four main focuses.
•

It is illegal for:

"Anyone to knowingly and willingly defraud any
healthcare benefit program or to obtain by means

of false representations any money or property of

a healthcare benefit program,
•

Make false statements which criminalizes any

false or fictitious statements in any matter
involving a healthcare benefit program,

•

Embezzle, convert, or steal any funds, property,
or assets of a healthcare benefit program, or
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•

Obstruct, delay, prevent, or mislead the

investigation of federal healthcare offenses"
(HIPAA of 1996).

Penalties for felonies include a fine dependent on the
extent of damages and five years maximum in prison.

If

someone is caused serious bodily injury during the crime
then the penalty is twenty years maximum in prison.

If the

crime has caused death then the penalty is life in prison
HIPPA does have its opponents though.

According to

Sparrow, not one provider group showed support for it when
it came out, especially the home health lobby and the
American Hospital Association.

In 1997 the Office of

Inspector General found that 40 percent of payments made in
respect to home health claims should not have been paid and

that many of the patients did not even fit the definition
of homebound.

This forced the federal government to put a

moratorium on admission to home health agencies in respect

to the Medicare program.

This would later be overturned

with pressure from the National Association for home care
along with its political allies.
Even though powerful laws may be enacted the agencies

will still try to find a way around them.
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With money and

political forces behind the agencies it will be a tough
fight to control healthcare fraud.

Manual of Model Disciplinary Orders
and Disciplinary Guidelines;
Disciplinary Guidelines;
Fraud Crimes

Laws and statutes on the federal level have been

examined so far but states have ways to combat medical
fraud as well.

The Medical Board of California and the

Board of Chiropractic Examiners each publish their own
Manual of Model Disciplinary Orders and Disciplinary
Guidelines.

This is a manual of business and professional

codes (B&P codes) that relate to medical fraud and other
non-fraud medical crimes.

It is important to note that

medical fraud on all levels hurt government, healthcare
programs, and taxpayers.
, Crimes that fall under the category of fraud are

misleading advertising, failure to maintain adequate
records, dishonesty, procuring license by fraud, making

false statements or alteration of medical records, and
fictitious name violation.

These crimes are fraud crimes

because they deal with acts of dishonesty.

The maximum

punishment for all of these crimes is revocation of
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license.

The minimum punishment for all of these crimes,

except dishonesty and fictitious name violation, is stayed
revocation and 5 years probation.

Dishonesty covers stayed

revocation and 5 to 7 years probation.

Fictitious name

violation covers stayed revocation and one year probation.
The punishments for these crimes differ for chiropractors.

Stayed revocation is still a minimum punishment but the
probation time is considerable less.

Revocation is still

the maximum.

Non-Fraud Crimes in the Healthcare Industry

Whereas healthcare fraud may be the healthcare crime

most focused on there are other ways medical professionals

break the law.

There are many crimes in the healthcare

industry that do not fall under the fraud category.

The

non-fraud crimes are as follows: "medication errors,
diagnosis failures, negligent supervision, delayed

treatment, failure to obtain consent, lack of proper

credentialing or technical skill, unexpected death,
lastrogenic injury, nosocomial and wound infections, pain
and suffering, emotional distress, or lack of teamwork and

communication" (Glabman, 2004).
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Manual of Model Disciplinary Orders
and Disciplinary Guidelines;
Disciplinary Guidelines;
Non-Fraud Crimes

Excessive prescribing or prescribing without a prior
examination, excessive treatments, mental or physical
illness, prescribing to addicts, general unprofessional

conduct, gross negligence, repeated negligent acts, and
incompetence all fall under the category of non-fraud
crimes.

This is so because these are crimes in which the

healthcare professional is not necessarily showing
dishonesty, but rather, a lack of knowledge.

The maximum

punishment for all of these crimes is revocation of

license.

The minimum punishment is stayed revocation and 5

years probation.

It is important to note that in fraud and

non-fraud crimes, the punishments that fall in between the

maximum and minimum punishments vary according to crime.

As with fraud crimes, the punishments for non-fraud crimes
concerning chiropractors are different.

Probation time is

less for chiropractors but the minimum and maximum

punishments concerning revocation are the same.

22

Research Questions

Healthcare fraud and non-fraud healthcare crimes are
major problems within the healthcare industry.

The study

used the business and professional codes that pertained to
fraud and non-fraud crimes rather than the federal
statutes.

This was so because on the state level many of

the crimes listed above match the crimes on the federal
level.

These are the research questions this study'

examined follows:
la)

Is state region related to fraud?

region not related to non-fraud?

2)

related to type of punishment (i.e.,

community, supervision, and others)?

lb)

Is state

Is state region
education, loss,

3)

Do surgeons and

physicians commit individual offenses more than others.

4)

Is type of offense (i.e., fraud and non-fraud) related to
type of doctor?

5)

Is type of individual punishment

related to type

Are the type of punishments

related to type of doctor?
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CHAPTER THREE
METHODOLOGY

Sample

The sample was collected through the
www.medbd.ca.gov/pubs Actionrept.htm and through the
www.chiro.ca.gov/enforcement website.

The

www.medbd.ca.gov/pubs_Actionrept.htm site contains action

reports of doctors who have broken business and
professional codes in the state of California.

The

www.chiro.ca.gov/enforcement website is the site that
contains decision action resumes of chiropractors who have

broken business and professional codes in the state of

California.

The Medical Board of California Action reports

give the name of the medical professional, city of
practice, code or codes broken, the crime or crimes, and

the punishment or punishments (see Appendix C).

The

decision action resume contains the chiropractor's name,

city of practice, codes broken, crime committed, and

penalty (see Appendix D).
The sampling criteria consisted of healthcare
professionals and chiropractors who have committed

healthcare fraud and non-fraud crimes.
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The healthcare

fraud and non-fraud categories contained crimes that fell
under those two headings.

The action reports fell between

August 1, 2004 to July 31, 2005.

The decision action

resumes also fell in the same time period.

The sampling

criteria consisted of physicians and surgeons,
psychologists, podiatrists, physician assistants, and

chiropractors.

These were the healthcare professionals

that have been recorded into the action reports and

decision action resumes.

The total sample population

totaled 212.

Data Collection

The database was created out of information from the
action reports and the Manual of Model Disciplinary Orders
and Disciplinary Guidelines from the Medical Board of

California (see Appendix E) and the Manual of Model

Disciplinary Orders and Disciplinary Guidelines from the
Board of Chiropractic Examiners (see Appendix F).

Variables that were collected from the action reports and
decisions action resumes respectively were physicians &

surgeons, psychologists, podiatrists, physician assistants,

chiropractors, type of offense, the punishment or
punishments that were handed out, and the city in which the
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healthcare professional is practicing, and code or codes

broken.

Variables that were collected from the Manual of

Model Disciplinary Orders and Disciplinary Guidelines from

the Medical Board of California and the Board of

Chiropractic Examiners were maximum punishments, minimum
punishments.

The data was collected through unobtrusive research.
Unobtrusive research is a "method of studying social

behavior without affecting it" (Babbie, 2005, p. 327).

The

study used the unobtrusive research method of analysis of
existing statistics.

The bulk of the data came from the

California Medical Board Action Reports and the California
Medical Board Manual of Model Disciplinary Orders and
Disciplinary Guidelines as well as the Board of
Chiropractic Examiners decision action resumes and the

Manual of Model Disciplinary Orders and Disciplinary

Guidelines from the Board of Chiropractic Examiners.
As is common in the analysis of existing statistics
the unit of analysis will not be the individual (Babbie, p.
342).

Babbie (p. 342) states that in Durkheim's study he

had to work with the political-geographical units of

countries, regions, states, and cities.

The study used the

units of medical professionals, codes broken, punishments,
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and cities the medical professional works in.

All of these

units will not look at one individual but a host of them.

Instruments
Once the data was collected it was put into an Excel
spreadsheet.

The Excel spreadsheet was then converted into

an SPSS spreadsheet for data analysis.

By using an Excel

spreadsheet the data was organized into categories for
comparisons.

Limitations

One of the limitations of the study revolved around
validity and reliability.

Problems that arise in question

to validity are whether the existing data covers exactly
what the researcher is interested in and that the

researcher's measurements may not be altogether valid
(Babbie, p. 242).

Babbie (p. 242) states that this can be

solved through logical reasoning and replication.

The

study did not have validity problems because the data

matched what the researcher is examining.

Problems of reliability in the use of existing
statistics rise up in terms of the "statistics themselves"

(Babbie, 2005, p. 343).

In respect to the study the
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reliability problem was in the cases themselves.

Even

though the action report contains cases for a year it was

not known if these are all of the cases.

Only the medical

professionals who were caught appear in the action reports.

It was not known how many got away with breaking the codes
or if every case was put in the action reports or if the
number of cases for the year represents the true number of

the amounts of cases.
The study faced the same reliability problems as

researchers have had with any research concerned with
record keeping.

The action reports have to be kept and

organized either by computer or people.

This created a

problem because it was not known to what extent if anything

was left out or if anything was increased dramatically in
respect to the information inserted into the action
reports.

Babbie (p. 343) states that the best way to protect
research from this problem is to be aware of it.

As long

as the researcher knows that reliability problems can arise
in the use of existing statistics then it can be dealt

with.

Babbie (p. 343) states that logical reasoning and

replication can help the researcher cope with the problem.
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The sample also posed some limitations.

Only five

healthcare professional groups will be looked at.

This

meant that an overall view of healthcare professionals will

not be given.

Many healthcare professional categories were

not included.'

Another limitation was the use of the

California business & professional codes only.

This was a

limitation because it will only give a state of California
perspective of the problem. • Even though it was a

limitation in respect to the problem on a national level

the categories of fraud and non-fraud crimes that the

Medical Board of California and the Board of Chiropractic
Examiners of California uses do closely match with fraud

and non-fraud crimes on the federal level.
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CHAPTER FOUR
ANALYSIS

Introduction

The chapter reports on the results.
tests and analysis of variance were used.

tables were constructed.

For this study tTwo frequency

Table 4.1 summarizes the number

of offenses.

Table 4.2 summarizes the number of

punishments.

The tests performed will be used to explore

the research questions.

fraud?
2)

lb)

la)

Is state region related to

Is state region not related to non-fraud?

Is state region related to type of punishment (i.e.,

education, loss, community, supervision, and others)?

3)

Do surgeons and physicians commit individual offenses more
than others.

4)

Is type of offense (i.e., fraud and non-

fraud) related to type of doctor?

5) Is type of individual

punishment related to type of doctor?

6)

Are the type of

punishments related to type of doctor?

Type of Doctors

Types of doctor were separated into surgeon/physician

(n=180), podiatrist (n=3), physician assistant (n=7),
psychologist

(n=2), and chiropractor (n=20).
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The doctor

variables were recoded into two groups.

The two groups

were named surgeon/physician (n=180, 84.9%) and others

(n=32, 15.1%) for a total sample number (n=212).

Tri-Region
Thirty California counties from the action reports
were used in the study.

These 30 categories were recoded

into 3 groups: Southern California, Northern California,

and Central California.

In the Southern California group

there were 149 offenders (70.3%).

In the Northern

California group there were 52 offenders (24.5%). In the

Central California group there were 11 offenders (5.2%).

The large differences in the Southern California number

compared to those of the Northern California and Central
California groups could be due to population.

Southern

California contains Los Angeles (pop. 3,844,829) and San
Diego (pop. 1,255,540, two cities with a substantial number

of people.

In the study many of the cities were from the

Southern California region.

If the combined population of

San Diego and Los Angeles are added to the rest of the

Southern California cities used then they will easily

outnumber those used for Northern and Central California.
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Offenses and Punishments

Table 1 summarizes the number of offenses.

Table 1.
Number of Offenses Committed.

Frequency

Percent

205

96.7

7

3.3

0

201

94.8

1

9

4.2

2

2

.9

0

181

85.4

1

28

13.2

2

3

1.4

0

208

98.1

1

4

1.9

Number of Offenses

Prescription Fraud

0
1

*=.03

Records Fraud

*=.06

Billings Fraud

5<=,16
Kickbacks

*=.02
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Table 1.
Number of Offenses Committed-continued.

Frequency

Percent

0

205

96.7

1

6

2.8

2

1

.5

0

205

96.7

1

7

3.3

0

201

94.8

1

9

4.2

2

2

.9

0

181

85.4

1

28

13.2

2

3

1.4

Number of Offenses

Advertising Fraud

*=.04
Overutilization

*=.03

License Fraud

*=.06

Dishonesty

*=.16
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Table 1.
Number of Offenses Committed-continued.

Frequency

Percent

0

196

92.5

1

16

7.5

0

75

35.8

1

56

26.4

2

80 .

37.7

Number of Offenses
Insurance Fraud

*=.08
Negligence

*=1.02
Unprofessional
Conduct

179

84.4

0

32

15.1

1

1

.5

2

*=.16
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Table 1
Number of Offenses Committed-continued.

Frequency

Percent

0

192

90.6

1

20

9.4

0

134

63.2

1

77

36.3

2

1

.5

0

26

59.4

1

84

39.6

2

2

.9

Number of Offenses
Lack of Examination

*=.09

Failure to Maintain
Records

*=.37
Incompetence

*=.42
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Table 1.
Number of Offenses Committed-continued.

Number of Offenses

Frequency

Percent

0

197

92.9

1

13

6.1

2

2

.9

210

99.1

2

.9

0

209

98.6

1

3

1.4

Violating Statutes or

Acts

X=.O8

Failure to Obtain Consent
0

1
X=.O1
Lack of Credentialing or
Skill

*=.01
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Table 1.
Number of Offenses Committed-continued.

Frequency

Percent

0

209

98.6

1

2

.9

2

1

.5

0

203

95.8

1

6

2.8

2

3

1.4

Number of Offenses
Lack of Teamwork or
Communication

*=.02

Others

*=.06

Negligence (*=1.02) occurred the most out of all the

offenses.

Incompetence (*=.42) and failure to maintain

records (*=.37) occurred frequently as well.

offenses fall under the fraud category.

None of these

Under fraud

offenses billings fraud (*=.16) and dishonesty (*=.16)

occurred most frequently.

Table 2 summarizes the number of punishments committed
by medical professionals.
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Table 2
Number and. Type of Punishments.

Number of

Frequency

Percent

Punishments

Courses
0

101

47.6

1

47

22.2

2

43

20.3

3

18

8.5

4

3

1.4

Maintenance

200

94.3

0

12

5.7

0

208

98.1

1

4

1.9

*=.94
Record

1
*=.06

Community Service

*=.02
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Table -2
Number and Type of Punishments-continued.

Frequency

Percent

0

166

78.3

1

46

21.7

0

206

97.2

1

6

2.8

0

108

50.9

1

104

49.1

0

121

57.1

1

91

42.9

Number of Punishments
Monitor

*=.22

Supervision

*=.03
Revocation

*=.49

Probation

*=.43
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Table 2.
Number and Type of Punishments-continued.

Frequency

Percent

0

116

54.7

1

95

44.8

2

1

.5

0

129

60.8

1

81

38.2

2

2

.9

0

201

94.8

1

11

5.2

0

194

91.5

1

17

8.0

2

1

.5

Number of Punishments
Payback

*=.46

Programs

*=.40
Permission

*=.05

Prohibited

*=.09
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Table 2.

Number and Type of Punishments-continued.

Frequency

Percent

0

186

87.7

1

26

12.3

0

198

93.4

1

9

4.2

2

5

2.4

0

18

8.5

1

188

88.7

2

2

.9

3

4

1.9

Number of Punishments

Suspension

*=.12
Exam

*=.09

Other Punishments

*=. 96

The punishments that occurred most frequently were
courses

(*=.94),

Probation

revocation (*=.49), monitor

(*=.43), payback (*=.46), programs

other punishments

(*=.96).
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(*=.22),

(*=.40), and

Testing the Research Questions

•

la)

Is State Region Related to Fraud?

•

lb)

Is State Region Not Related to Non-fraud?

State region was tested with the variables fraud and
non-fraud in an analysis of variance test.

Fraud consists

of all individual fraud crimes as found in Table 1 (i.e.,

prescription fraud, records fraud, billings fraud,
advertising fraud, kickbacks, overutilization, license

fraud, dishonesty, and insurance fraud).

Non-fraud

consists of all non-fraud crimes found in Table 1

(Negligence, unprofessional conduct, lack of an

examination, failure to obtain consent, incompetence,
violating statutes or acts, lack of credentialing or skill,

failure to maintain records, lack of teamwork or
communication, and others).

The results (table 3) reveal

that state region is not related to fraud (F.99, p=.42).

State region is not related to non-fraud (F=1.15, p=.33)

either.

Research question la was not supported; state

region is not related to fraud.

Research question lb was

supported; state region is not related to non-fraud.
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Table 3.

Analysis of Variance for State Region by Fraud and Non
Fraud.
Type of

df

Mean

F

*

.70

.99

.42

2.24

1.15

.33

Offense
Fraud

Between Groups

5

Within Groups

206

Non-Fraud
Between Groups

7

Within Groups

204

2)
Is State Region Related to Type of Punishment (i.e.,
Education, Loss, Community, Supervision, and Others)?

The original punishments in table 2 were all recoded

into five variables.

Courses, programs, and exams were

recoded into education punishments.

Prohibited,

suspension, and revocation were recoded into the loss
punishments.

Payback, probation, and community service

were recoded into community punishments.

Record

maintenance, supervision, monitor, and permission were
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recoded into overseeing punishments.

An analysis of

variance test was then conducted on state region by the new
variables education punishments, loss punishments,

community punishments, overseeing punishments, and other
punishments (Table 4) to see whether state region is

related to type of punishment.
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Table 4.

Analysis of Variance for State Region by Type of
Punishments.

Type of

df

Mean

F

Sign.

1.43

2.70 -

. 02

.70

.52

.67

.48

.29

.75

Punishments

Education
Punishments

Between

5

Groups

206

Within Groups
Loss

Punishments

Between

3

Groups

208

-

Within Groups

Community
Punishments

Between

2

Groups

209

Within Groups

■
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Table 4.
Analysis of Variance for State Region by Type of

Punishments-continued.
Type of

df

Mean

F

Sign.

.78

. 19

.95

.96

. 11

.95

Punishments

Overseeing
Punishments
Between Groups

4

Within Groups

207

Other
Punishments

Between Groups

3

Within Groups

208

Education punishments (F=2.70, p=.O2) reached
significance.
punishments.

State region was only related to education
Research question 2 was not supported.

For

research question 2 to be supported state region needed to

be related to each of the type of punishments.
3)
Do Surgeons and Physicians Commit Individual Offenses
More than Others.
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A t-test analysis was conducted on to explore whether

surgeon/physician commit individual offenses more than

Table 5 summarizes the findings from the analysis.

others.

Table 5.
T-test for Surgeon/Physician and. Others by Variables for
Individual Offenses.

Individual

Mean

Standard

t

Sign.

. 84

. 40

Deviation

Offenses

Prescription
Fraud

Surgeon/Physician

. 16

.42

Others

.09

.39
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Table 5.
T-test for Surgeon/Physician and Others by Variables for
Individual Offenses-continued.
Individual

Mean

Standard

t

Sign.

-.37

.71

-7.65

.00

.85

.40

1.08

.28

Deviation

Offenses

Records Fraud
Surgeon/Physician

.10

.35

Others

.13

.34

Billinqs Fraud
Surgeon/Physician

.01

.11

Others

.31

.47

Kickbacks
Surgeon/Physician

.02

.15

Others

. 00

. 00

Advertising Fraud

Surgeon/Physician

.04

.23

Others

.00

.00
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Table 5.
T-test for Surgeon/Physician and. Others by Variables for
Individual Offenses-continued.
Individual Offenses

Mean

Standard

t

Sign.

-3.22

. 00

-2.84

.01

-1.36

. 17

Deviation
Overutilization

Surgeon/Physician

.02

. 13

Others

.13

.34

License Fraud
Surgeon/Physician

. 04

.22

Others

.19

.47

Dishonesty

Surgeon/Physician

.14

.38

Others

.25

.51

Insurance Fraud
Surgeon/Physician

.03

. 18

Others

.31

.47

-5.92
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.

.00

Table 5.
T-test for Surgeon/Physician and Others by Variables for
Individual Offenses-continued.
Individual

Mean ■

Standard

t

Sign.

3.82

.00

1.59

.11

.67

.51

Deviation

Offenses

Negligence

Surgeon/Physician

1.11

.85

Others

.50

.72

Unprofessional
Conduct

Surgeon/Physician

.18

.40

Others

.06

.25

Lack of

Examination
Surgeon/Physician

.10

.30

Others

.06

.25
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Table 5.
T-test for Surgeon/Physician and Others by Variables for
Individual Offenses-continued.
Individual

Mean

Standard

t

Sign.

3.56

.00

2.38

.02

.36

.72

Deviation

Offenses
Failure to

Maintain Records
Surgeon/Physician

.42

.51

Others

.09

.30

Incompetence

Surgeon/Physician

. 45

.52

Others

.22

.42

Violating Statutes

or Acts
Surgeon/Physician

.08

.31

Others

.06

.25
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Table 5.

T-test for Surgeon/Physician and Others by Variables for
Individual Offenses-continued.
Individual

Mean

Offenses

Standard

t

Sign.

-1.39

.17

.73

.46

-1.61

.11

Deviation

Failure to Obtain
Consent

Surgeon/Physician

.01

.07

Others

.03

.17

Lack of
Credentialing or

Skill
Surgeon/Physician

.02

.13

Others

.00

.00

Lack of Teamwork
or Communication

Surgeon/Physician

.01

.01

Others

.06

.06
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Table 5.
T-test for Surgeon/Physician and Others by Variables for
Individual Offenses-continued.
Individual

Mean

Standard

t

Sign.

-.80

. 43

Deviation

Offenses
Others

Surgeon/Physician

.05

.29

Others

.09

.30

The most common offenses were billings fraud,

overutilization, license fraud, insurance fraud,
negligence, failure to maintain records, and incompetence.

Billings fraud was committed by others (*=.31) more than

surgeon/physician (*=.01).

Overutilization was committed by

others (*=.13) more than surgeon/physician (*=.02).

License

fraud was committed by others (*=.19) more than
surgeon/physician (*=.04).

Insurance fraud was committed by

others (*=.31) more than surgeon/physicians (*=.03).
Negligence was committed by surgeon/physician (*=1.11) more

than others (*=.50).

Surgeon/physician (*=.42) committed

failure to maintain records more than others (*=.09).
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.Incompetence was committed more by surgeon/physician (*=.45)

more than others (*=.22).
supported.

Research question 3 was not

In the seven offenses that reached significance

four of them were committed by others while three of them
were committed by surgeon/physician.
4)
Is Type of Offense (i.e.,- Fraud and Non-fraud) Related
to Type of Doctor?

A T-test was also conducted to see whether type of

offense (i;e., fraud and non-fraud is related to type of

doctor.

Table 6 explores the results.
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Table 6.
T-test for Surgeon/Physician and Others by Fraud and Non-

fraud.
Type of Offenses

Mean

Standard

t

*

-4.31

.00

3.96

.00

Deviation

Fraud

Surgeon/physician

.57

. 99

Others

1.41

1.13

Non-Fraud

Surgeon/physician

2.42

1.63

Others

1.19

1.67

Fraud (p=.00) and non- fraud (p=.00) both reached
significance.

Between surgeon/physician and other it was

others (*= 1.41) that committed fraud more often.

Surgeon/physician (*= 2.42) committed non-fraud offenses

more often. Research question 4 was supported by the test;
the type of offense is related to the type of doctor. Fraud

is related to others while non-fraud is related to
surgeon/physician.
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5) Is Type of Individual Punishment Related to Type of
Doctor?

A T-Test analysis was conducted to see whether type of
individual punishment is related to type of doctor.

Table

7 examines the results of the test.

Table 7.
T-test for Surgeon/Physician and Others by Type of
Individual Punishments.
Type of

Mean

Standard

t

Sign.

2.55

.01

Deviation

Punishments

Courses
Surgeon/Physician

1.02

1.10

Others

.50

.76
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Table 7.
T-test for Surgeon/Physician and Others by Type of
Individual Punishments-continued.
Type of

Mean

Standard

t

Sign.

-.16

. 88

-3.46

.00

2.80

.01

-4.99

.00

Deviation

Punishments
Record Maintenance

Surgeon/Physician
Others

.06

.23

.06

.25

Community Service

Surgeon/Physician

.01

.07

Others

.09

.30

Monitor

Surgeon/Physician

.25

. 43

Others

.03

.18

Supervision
Surgeon/Physician

.01

.07

Others

.16

.37
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Table 7.
T-test for Surgeon/Physician and Others by Type of
Individual Punishments-continued.

Type of

Mean

Standard

t

Sign.

-4.09

. 00

-1.66

1.00

-3.63

. 00

5.10

. 00

Deviation

Punishments

Revocation
Surgeon/Physician

.43

.50

Others

. 81

. 40

Probation

Surgeon/Physician

. 41

.49

Others

.56

.50

Payback

Surgeon/Physician

. 41

.49

Others

.75

.51

Programs
Surgeon/Physician

.47

.52

Others

. 00

.00
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Table 7.
T-test for Surgeon/Physician and Others by Type of
Individual Punishments-continued.
Type of Punishments

Mean

Standard

t

Sign.

-.29

.77

.55

.58

-3.65

.00

-7.21

.00

Deviation

Permission
Surgeon/Physician

.05

.22

Others

.06

.25

Prohibited
Surgeon/Physician

. 09

.31

Others

.06

.25

Suspension
Surgeon/Physician

.09

.29

Others

.31

.47

Exam
Surgeon/Physician

.02

.15

Others

.47

.76
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Table 7.
T-test for Surgeon/Physician and Others by Type of
Individual Punishments-continued.
Type of Punishments

Standard

Mean

t

Sign

2.74

,.01

Deviation
Other Punishments

Surgeon/Physician

. 99

.36

Others

.78

. 61

The most common punishments were courses (p=.01),

community service (p=.00), monitor (p=.01), supervision (p=
.00), revocation (p= .00), payback, programs (p=.00),

suspension (p=.00), exam (p=.00), and other punishments
(p=.01).

The results support research question 5.

Each of

the significant punishments were related to certain types

of doctors.
Surgeon/physician (*= 1.02) received courses. Others (*

= .,09) received community service.,
.25) received monitor.
supervision.

Surgeon/physician (*=

Others (*= .16) received

Others (*= .81) received revocation.
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Others

(*= .75) received payback.

received programs.

Surgeon/physician (*= .47)

Others (*= .31) received suspension.

Others (*= .76) received exam.

Others (*= .78) other

punishments.
6)

Are the Type of Punishments Related to Type of Doctor?

A t-test was conducted to see whether the type of
punishment is related to the type of doctor (Table 8).
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Table 8.

T-test for Surgeon/Physician and Others by Punishment
Groups.
Type of

Mean

Standard

t

Sign.

2.12

.04

-3.91

. 00

-4.4 6

.00

Deviation

Punishments

Education
Punishments
Surgeon/Physician

1.51

1.35

Others

. 97

1.23

Loss Punishments

Surgeon/Physician

. 62

.77

Others

1.19

. 69

Community
Punishments
Surgeon/Physician

.41

.49

Others

.84

.57
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Table 8.
T-test for Surgeon/Physician and Others by Punishment

Groups-continued.
Type of

Mean

Standard

t

Sign.

-.54

.59

2.74

.01

Deviation

Punishments

Overseeing
Punishments

Surgeon/Physician

.77

1.08

Others

.88

. 87

Other Punishments

Surgeon/Physician

. 99

. 36

Others

.78

. 61

The most common type of punishments were education
punishments (p=.O4), loss punishments (p=.00), community

punishments (p=.00), and other punishments (p=.01).

Surgeon/physician (*= 1.51) received education punishments
over others.

Others (*= 1.19) received loss punishments

over surgeon/physician.

Others (*= .84) received community
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punishments over surgeon/physician.

Surgeon/physician (*=

.99) received other punishments over others.

Research

question 6. was supported; the type of punishment was

related to type of doctor.

Number of Doctors in California
212 cases were examined in the study.

In order to see

the ratio of cases to the number of doctors the number of
doctors- in California had to be found.

Some of the figures

taken were from the time period of the study while others

came from different years a little before or after the time
period the study focused on.

During 2004-2005 California

had between 92,852 in 2004 to 94,546 in 2005
(http://ca.rand.org/stats/health/physicians.html).

In 1993

chiropractors in California numbered 2,830 and went up to

4,080 in 2004.

Physician assistants numbered 5,110 in 1993

Podiatrists numbered 2,100

and went up to 6,330 to 2005.

in 2003 while psychologists (clinical, counselors, and
school psychologists) numbered 12,400 in 2002

(http://www.labormarketinfo.edd.ca.gov/cgi/career/?PageID=3

■&SubID=139) .
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What these numbers show is that with surgeons and
physicians fraud is not widespread when compared to the
number of cases in the study.

In terms of the others

variable their number in the study is small but so are the
numbers of those employed in those professions in

California.

Fraud is definitely a problem within these

groups.
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CHAPTER FIVE
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

Summary of Data

The tests conducted supported research questions lb,
4, 5, and 6.

Research questions la, 2, and 3 were not

supported by the tests.

State region was not related to

fraud (la) nor was state region related to non-fraud (lb).

State region was not related to type of punishment (2).
Surgeon/physician did not commit individual offenses more
than those in the others variable (3), it was found to be

the opposite.

The type of offense, when put into fraud and

non-fraud variables, were related to type of doctor (4).

Surgeon/physician committed non-fraud offenses while other

doctors committed fraud offenses.

The type of individual

punishment was found to be related to type of doctor (5).

The type of punishment group was also found to be related

to type of doctor (6).

Policy Implications

The purpose of these tests were to examine the overall
severity of fraud and how it was punished within the

medical industry by the Medical Board of California and the
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Chiropractor Board of California.

In the study the

majority of the sample were the surgeon/physician variable

group.

Even though this was, surgeon/physician committed

non-fraud offenses and in the individual offenses crimes

such as incompetence and negligence were committed by the

same group.

The much smaller others variable were found to

commit non-fraud offenses with individual offenses such as

billings fraud and insurance fraud committed by the same
group.
What this means is that perhaps surgeons and

physicians are not looking to commit fraud.

The study

suggests that the specialists (found in the others group.)
are the ones looking to commit fraud.

If this is the case

then it would seem to be that the Medical Board of

California is taking the necessary steps to combat medical
fraud.

The tests used to examine punishments support this.

For example, courses were given to surgeon/physician while

payback was given to others.

Even when the individual

punishments were grouped the results were similar.

For

example, education courses were given to surgeon/physician

while loss punishments were given to others.

The

Chiropractic Board of California, on the other hand, needs

to find a way to combat fraud.
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With chiropractors making

up the majority of the others group and fraud being

prevalent among the others group the Chiropractic Board is
not doing enough to reduce the problem.
For policy purposes, tougher regulations against fraud
would help the problem but it may not help in decreasing

the problem.

In this study fraud was committed by others.

Originally, others consisted of chiropractors, podiatrists,

physician's assistants, and psychologists before being
recoded into others.

Except for physician's assistants,

the other three are specialists.

What is unique in this

study is that the others group is small in sample size but
was still found to commit fraud more than

surgeon/physician.

A possible policy action would be to

regulate these types of doctors more closely.

One way of doing this would be to allow agencies like
the Medical Board of California and the Chiropractic Board

of California to hand out tougher punishments for fraud
related offenses rather than only the customary restitution

or revocation of license.

The problem with revoking a

fraud offender's license is that a non-fraud offender, with

enough non-fraud offenses against him or her, can have

their license revoked as well.
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The punishments for fraud

offenses and non-fraud offenses need to be better defined
and tougher on fraud offenses.

Theoretical Implications
Deterrence theory was used to explain why doctors
would commit fraud.

Deterrence theory states "...that

actions are taken and decisions are made by persons in the

rational exercise of free will.

All individuals choose to

obey or violate the law by a rational calculation of the
risk of the pain versus potential pleasure derived from an

act.

In contemplating a criminal act, they take into

account the probable legal penalties and the likelihood
that they will be caught.

If the'y believe that the legal

penalty threatens more pain than the probable gain produced
by the crime then they will not commit the crime.

Their

calculation is based on their own experience with the

criminal punishment, their knowledge of what punishment is
imposed by law, and their awareness of what punishment has

been given to apprehended offenders in the past" (Akers &

Sellers, p. 18) .
Deterrence theory would help explain why others

committed fraud.

The doctors in that group see the reward

as being greater than the punishment.
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Punishments given to

the fraud offenders in the study are not harsh enough to

warrant caution for the offenders.

As stated earlier, if a

non-fraud offender commits enough offenses he or she can

face the same punishments that a fraud offender can.
Because of this fraud is a tempting offense in a weakly

regulated industry.
Even though Deterrence Theory could be used to explain

fraud offenses it does not actually apply to fraud offenses

overall committed in the study.

This is so because the

majority of the sample (surgeon/physician) did not commit

fraud offenses most often.

often.

Non-fraud was committed more

This would indicate that the risk for fraud is

greater than the reward, going against Deterrence Theory.

Conclusion
In conclusion, more research in this area is needed.
The database was strictly constructed from the Medical
Board of California and Chiropractic Board of California

and therefore, only a state view is presented.

At the time

of this study there was no known database detailing the

offenses and punishments.

Constructing a larger database

would require massive research and time but it would
present a more concise picture of how great the fraud
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problem really is.

Healthcare fraud is a major problem

according to the sources cited earlier and therefore, more
research, no matter how difficult, is necessary and

beneficial.
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APPENDIX A
MEDICAID FALSE CLAIMS STATUTE
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Medicaid False Claims Statute
Criminal Penalties for Acts Involving Medicare or

State Health Care Programs, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1320(a)7(b)
criminalizes the making of false statements or
representations in connection with any applications for
claim of benefits or payment, or disposal of assets under a

federal health care program.

Penalties of being convicted

through this statute include a fine no larger that $25,000,

imprisonment for no more than five years, or both.
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APPENDIX B

MEDICAID ANTI-KICKBACK STATUTE
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Medicaid Anti-Kickback Statute
"Whoever knowingly and willingly solicits or receives
any remuneration (including any kickback, bribe, or rebate)

directly or indirectly, overtly or covertly, in cash or in
kind (A) in return for referring an individual to a person
for the furnishing or arranging for the furnishing of any

item or service for which payment may be made in whole or

in part under title XVIII or a State health care program,
or (B) in return for purchasing, leasing, ordering, or

arranging for or recommending, purchasing, leasing, or
ordering any good, facility, service, or item for which

payment may be made in whole or in part under title XVIII

or a State health care program, shall be guilty of a felony
and upon conviction thereof, shall be fined not more than
$25,000 or imprisoned for not more than five years, or

both.

Whoever knowingly and willfully offers or pays any

remuneration (including any kickback, bribe, or rebate)

directly or indirectly, overtly or covertly, in cash or in
kind to any person to induce such person (A) to refer an
individual to a person for the furnishing or arranging for

the furnishing of any item or service for which payment may

be made in whole or in part under title XVIII, or a State
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health care program, or (B) to purchase, lease, order, or
arrange for or recommend purchasing, leasing, or ordering
any good, facility, service, or item for which payment may

be made in whole or in part under title XVIII or a State
health care program, shall be guilty of a felony and upon

conviction thereof, shall be fined not more than $25,000 or
imprisoned for not more than five years, or both" (Medicaid
Anti-Kickback Statute as found in the Medicare and Medicaid
Patient and Program Protection Act of 1987) .

APPENDIX C

MEDICAL BOARD OF CALIFORNIA ACTION REPORT
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ADMINISTRATIVE ACTIONS: August 1, 2004 to October 31, 2004
PHYSICIANS AND SURGEONS
ABDELAZIZ, MOHAMED I., M.D. (A37224)
Valrico, FL
B&P Code §§141(a), 2305. Stipulated Decision.
Disciplined by Florida for failing to timely and
adequately diagnose an abnormal fetal heart rate
pattern; review the fetal monitor strip; adequately
monitor the patient; and attempt intrauterine
resuscitation in the care and treatment of 1 patient.
Surrender of license. September 16, 2004

ABRAHAMIAN, AZNIV A., M.D. (A50782)
North Hollywood, CA
B&P Code §2234. Stipulated Decision. No admissions
but charged with prescribing or dispensing medication
without a good faith prior examination. Physician
completed a prescribing practices course and an
ethics course. Public Letter of Reprimand.
August 23, 2004
ACEVES, JOSE ADELELMO, M.D. (A48529)
Whittier, CA
B&P Code §2234(b). Stipulated Decision. Committed
acts of gross negligence and unprofessional conduct

by failing to promptly treat a 73-year-old patient who
had been diagnosed with a myocardial infarction. The
patient refused treatment and was allowed to leave
the office without being provided adequate care,
instructions and referral by calling 911. Public Letter
of Reprimand. August 4, 2004
ADAMS, JOHN SINDOS, M.D. (AFE45632)
Ooltewah, TN
B&P Code §§141 (a), 2234, 2305. Stipulated Decision.
Disciplined by Georgia for failing to complete the
required board profile in a timely manner and
indicating on a renewal application that the profile had
been completed, when it was not. Public Letter of
Reprimand. October 19, 2004

ADLER, STEPHEN CHARLES, M.D. (G17393)
Moline, IL
B&P Code §§141(a), 2232(a), 2305. Stipulated
Decision. Disciplined by New York for conviction of
criminal charges involving indecent solicitation of a
child. Physician also required to register as a sex
offender. Revoked. October 22, 2004

Explanation of Disciplinary Language and Actions
?

“Effective date of decision” —
Example: “September 16, 2004*’ at
the bottom of the summary means
the date the disciplinary' decision
goes into operation.

$

t

“Gross negligence” — An extreme
deviation from the standard of
practice.

■

‘Incompetence’* — Lack of
knowledge or skills in discharging
professional obligations.

v
|
|
J
|
t
.

“Judicial review is being
pursued” — The disciplinary
decision is being challenged through
the court system —Superior Court,
maybe Court of Appeal, maybe
State Supreme Court. The discipline
is currently in effect.

\
|

“Probationary License” — A
conditional license issued to an
applicant on probationary terms and
conditions. This is done when good
cause exists for denial of the license
application.

>
'

“Probationary’ Terms and
Conditions** — Examples:
Complete a clinical training
program. Take educational courses
in specified subjects. Take a course
in ethics. Pass an oral clinical exam.
Abstain from alcohol and drugs.
Undergo psychotherapy or medical
treatment Surrender your DEA
drug permit. Provide free services
to a community facility.
“Public Letter of Reprimand’* -—
A lesser form of discipline that can
be negotiated for minor violations
before the filing of formal charges
(Accusations). The licensee is
disciplined in the foim of a public
letter.

“Revoked” — The license is
canceled, voided, annulled,
rescinded. The right to practice is
ended.

“Revoked, stayed, 5 years
probation on terms and conditions,
including 60 days suspension” —
“Stayed” means the revocation is
postponed, put off. Professional
practice may continue so long as the
licensee complies with specified
probationary terms and conditions,
which, in this example, includes 60
days actual suspension from practice.
Violation of probation may result in the
revocation that was postponed.

?
;
<
*

“Stipulated Decision” — A form of
plea bargaining. The case is negotiated
and settled prior to trial.

I

“Surrender” — To resolve a
disciplinary action, the licensee has
given up his or her license — subject
to acceptance by the board.

?
)
|
|

“Suspension from practice” — The
licensee is prohibited from practicing
for a specific period of time.

i
|
|

Medical Board ofCalifornia
January 2005
Page 17
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APPENDIX D
DECISION ACTION RESUME
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Decision Action Resume
September 2004
Case No.:

2004-435

Dec/Stip:

Stipulation

Admissions:

X

Yes

Name:

Gary Beytin
San Jose, CA

License No.:

DC-14315

No

Effective Date: September 3, 2004
Penalty:

Revoked, stayed, 2 years probation,
$814,000 in costs

Summary:

Respondent violated Business and
Professions Codes section 1000-10
when he was convicted of Penal Code
Sections 484 and 488 (petty theft).

Case No.:

2004-403

Dec/Stip:

Stipulation

Admissions:

X

Yes

Name:

Linda Phan
San Jose, CA

License No.:

DC-27148

No

Effective Date: September 3,'2004
Penalty:

Revoked, stayed, 5 years, $7,968
in costs, CPA, 6 units in ethics,
California law exam.
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Summary:

Respondent engaged in inflated or
fraudulent billing, he was convicted
for Penal Code 550(a)(1).
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APPENDIX E

MANUAL OF MODEL DISCIPLINARY ORDER
AND DISCIPLINARY GUIDELINES
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. State of California

State and Consumer Services Agency

MEDICAL BOARD OF CALIFORNIA
DIVISION OF MEDICAL QUALITY

,■ *
; f*

J* ;

c

I * :
i *

•

rzn)

'* 1
I * '■
'■ *

MANUAL OF MODEL DISCIPLINARY ORDERS
AND DISCIPLINARY GUIDELINES
9th Edition
2003
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GENERAL UNPROFESSIONAL CONDUCT (B&P 2234), or
GROSS NEGLIGENCE [B&P 2234 (b)], or
REPEATED NEGLIGENT ACTS [B&P 2234(c)], or
INCOMPETENCE [B&P 2234(d)], or
FAILURE TO MAINTAIN ADEQUATE RECORDS (B&P 2266)

Minimum penalty: Stayed revocation, 5 years probation
Maximum penalty: Revocation
J.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.

Education course [14.]
Prescribing Practices Course (15)
Medical Record Keeping Course [16]
Ethics Course [17]
Clinical Training Program [19]
Oral or Written Examination [20] (preferably Condition Precedent)
Monitoring - Practice Billing [24]
Solo Practice [25]
Prohibited Practice [27]

DISHONESTY - Substantially related to the qualifications, functions or duties of a
physician and surgeon and arising from or occurring during patient care, treatment,
management or billing (B&P 2234(e)]

Minimum penalty: Stayed revocation, one year suspension at least 7 years probation
Maximum penalty: Revocation.
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.

Ethics Course [17]
Oral or Written Examination [20]
Psychiatric Evaluation [21]
Medical Evaluation [23]
Monitoring-Practice/Billing [24]
Solo Practice [25]
Prohibited Practice [27]

DISHONESTY - Substantially related to the qualifications, function or duties of a physician
and surgeon but not arising from or occurring during patient care, treatment, management or
billing [BP 2234 (e)|
Minimum penalty:
Maximum penalty:

1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.

Stayed revocation. 5 years probation
Revocation

Suspension of 60 days or more [4]
Ethics Course [17]
Psychiatric Evaluation [21]
Medical Evaluation [23]
Monitoring-Practice/Billing (if financial dishonesty or conviction of financial crime) [24]
Restitution to Victim

REV. 2003

31
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APPENDIX F

MANUAL OF MODEL DISCIPLINARY ORDER AND
DISCIPLINARY GUIDELINES AS

PUBLISHED BY THE BOARD
OF CHIROPRACTIC
EXAMINERS
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Board of Chiropractic
Examiners

Disciplinary Guidelines
and
Model Disciplinary Orders

Adopted by the board January 28.1999
Revised September 23,1999
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317(a)
317(b)
317(d)
317(c)
317(f)
317(g)
317(h)
317(1)
3170)
317(1)
317(p)
317(r)
317(s)

Gross negligence
Repeated negligent acts
Excessive treatment
Intentionally or recklessly causing harm to the public
Habitual intemperance with drugs or alcohol
Conviction of a crime
Conviction involving moral turpitude, dishonesty, or corruption
Possession, distribution, or use of drugs
Commission of dishonest or fraudulent act related to duties or functions of license
Aiding and abetting unlicensed activity’
Obtaining fee by fraud or deceit
Use of cappers or steerers
Fee for referrals

Business' and Professions Code
1054
1055

725
726
810

Name of a chiropractic corporation
Officers of chiropractic corporation not licensed as required in Professional
Corporation Act
Excessive prescribing or treatment (for use in less egregious cases)
Sexual relations with patients (for use in less egregious cases)
False or fraudulent claims (for use in less egregious cases)

CATEGORY IV

Penalty:

Revocation

Recommended for more egregious cases involving insurance fraud, sexual misconduct,
excessive treatment. Revocation is also recommended when: I) respondent fails to file a notice
of defense or to appear at a disciplinary hearing where the board has requested revocation in the
accusation; 2) respondent violates the terms and conditions ol' probation from a previous
disciplinary order; and 3) where prior discipline has been imposed, as progressive discipline
unless respondent can demonstrate satisfactory evidence of rehabilitation.

California Code, of Regulations

316(a)
317(d)
317(g)
317(h)

Sexual misconduct
Excessive treatment
Conviction of a crime (involving insurance fraud)
Conviction involving moral turpitude, dishonesty, or corruption (involving
insurance, fraud}

3
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APPENDIX G

TERM DEFINITIONS
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Dishonesty: when a doctor knowingly does something wrong
without letting the patient knows of the deceit.

Monitor: when a doctor needs some kind of monitor to

perform a procedure or act pertaining to his or her job.
Supervision: when a doctor needs supervision to perform a

procedure or act pertaining to his or her job.
Permission: when a doctor needs permission to perform a

procedure or do an act pertaining to his or her job.
Loss punishments: punishments where some kind of loss is
involved.

Example would be revocation (having one's

license revoked), loss of license, or suspension of
license.

Community punishments: punishments dealing with giving back

to the community or dealing with a community agency.
Examples would be paying restitution to a member of the

community or having a probation officer.
Overseeing punishments: punishments dealing with the

overseeing of a procedure or act pertaining to the job.
Examples would be supervision or monitor.
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